Gradually, then Suddenly.
Happy Monday Morning!
Central banks finally broke something.
After leaving rates hovering near zero for over a decade and engaging in trillions of dollars worth of QE (Quantitative Easing) you can’t simply raise interest rates by 400bps in less than a year without something going boom in the night. It was never a matter of IF, but WHEN.
There are more qualified people than me to talk about the Silicon Valley Bank debacle so i’ll keep this brief.
Fed raised interest rates at the fastest pace on record when adjusted for debt loads.
Deposit rates failed to keep up without eroding bank profitability. So cash fled to higher yielding short term treasuries, money market funds, etc.
Meanwhile surging interest rates destroyed the value of bank collateral (mostly Government bonds)
Banks need to raise capital to fund withdrawals but if they liquidate these assets they realize losses on said assets. This compounds their weak capital base.
Depositors get nervous and pull cash. Contagion. End.
Banks are sitting on huge unrealized losses. The bonds they bought at ultra low interest rates were destroyed in price when the Fed jacked interest rates, and bonds are the collateral supporting the entire financial system.
For example, a 1% shift higher on a 9 year duration bond is a 9% hit on the bond price. So the Fed's ability to hike rates was ALWAYs limited to the extent to which banks invested cash wisely. Silicon Valley Bank is not alone.
Lots of chatter that the Fed might be done with their rate hiking crusade. Any more bank failures and we’ll be talking about deflation, not inflation.
The Bank of Canada has already moved to the sidelines as confirmed last week when they announced an ongoing pause. Higher interest rates are finally starting to bite.
The proportion of mortgages with amortization periods longer than 30 years:
BMO: 32.4%
CIBC: 30%
TD: 29.3%
RBC: 25%
In other words, a lot of mortgages have suddenly morphed into interest only mortgages when the Bank of Canada set off a wave of trigger rates. Something considered inconceivable just 12 months ago. Banks are allowing borrowers to kick the can because your house is the banks collateral and they don’t need your house hitting the MLS in a forced liquidation.
This partly explains the lack of inventory on the market.
It’s not just the residential side. Issues are bubbling up in the commercial Real Estate sector as well. The office market is in shambles, and we know development land has become illiquid. We highlighted a few weeks ago the sudden collapse of Coromandel, a Vancouver developer with nearly $1B in land holdings. They too are not alone.
As the old saying goes, “How did you go bankrupt?"
Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.
The value of all the world’s Real Estate is over $300 Trillion. And there is a lot of debt underpinning the value of that Real Estate.
In other words as that debt gets repriced, so too does the asset. Silicon Valley Bank is just a subtle reminder of what happens when you are suddenly forced to mark to market that collateral. Central banks will soon be forced to reverse course sooner rather than later.
From my thedailyupside.com email of this AM:
"Hindsight is 20/20, and, looking back, SVB had more red flags than you’d see on a Carolina beach in October. Here were the biggest, brightest ones that everyone seemed to miss:
• Red Flag No. 1: In its most recent earnings report in January, the bank revealed its held-to-maturity securities had mark-to-market losses of nearly $16 billion in Q3, against just $11.5 billion of tangible common equity. Essentially, the bank would be underwater if it was forced to liquidate all its assets.
• Red Flag No. 2: The cause of the losses is simple — the bank took its tens of billions of customer deposits and invested heavily in bonds with sizable interest-rate risk. Worse, it was overloaded on long-duration bonds with more than 10 years to maturity, leading to a mismatch of assets and liability.
• Red Flag No. 3: As of December, roughly 95% of deposits were above the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s $250K insurance limit, according to SEC filings. Make no mistake, this was a high-stakes poker game.
• Red Flag No. 4: Perhaps the risky maneuvering could have been avoided. But SVB operated without a Chief Risk Officer from April 2022 to January this year. That’s nine months… with no risk officer.
• Red Flag No. 5: SVB did employ a Chief Administrative Officer, Joseph Gentile, who had been with the company since 2007. His previous employer? Lehman Brothers. Perhaps he just found himself in the wrong place at the wrong time. Twice… in a row.
• Red Flag No. 6: CEO Greg Becker didn’t need a CRO. Just days before the bank disclosed the $1.8 billion loss that sparked the run, a trust owned by the big boss sold $3.6 million worth of SVB shares.
• Red Flag No. 7: Peter Thiel, the influential tech venture capitalist/aspiring supervillain, withdrew his Founders Fund’s entire account worth millions from the bank by at least Thursday, Bloomberg reported, and encouraged its portfolio companies to do the same.
• Red Flag No. 8: Where Thiel goes, well, so too do many tech leaders. The small, insular industry is practically by definition full of trend-chasers (these are many of the same folks who dropped everything to pursue Web 3.0, after all). In other words, it should’ve been a giant red flag that the bank’s entire clientele is hardwired to act in a way that perfectly facilitates bank runs.
Contagion containment: First Republic Bank, which has also been damaged by the fallout from SVB’s collapse, disclosed it had received a $70 billion liquidity infusion from The Fed and JPMorgan Chase, and meanwhile over in Britain, HSBC worked through the night Sunday to strike a deal with regulators to purchase SVB’s UK operation — less assets and liabilities — for £1."